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1. DATA PROTECTION AS UNDERSTOOD IN EU LAW 
The understanding that personal data protection is an area of law that requires 
special protection has been present since the 1950’s. Even if there were no legal 
instruments addressing specifically personal data, Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter – ECHR) provides for protection of 
personal life, which is understood to include personal data protection. Currently there 
are many European Union (hereinafter – EU) legal instruments that define data 
protection and set the main principles and obligations which have to be observed 
when dealing with personal data. In this chapter the author will, firstly, define the 
main elements of the concept of personal data as understood in EU law, secondly, 
analyse the main legal instruments applicable to data protection and, thirdly, address 
the institutions and bodies at EU and Member State (hereinafter – MS) level, which 
are competent to deal with data protection. 
1.1. Concept of personal data  
For the purposes of this research, it is important to define the main concepts of 
personal data protection in EU law. This chapter will focus on defining such concepts 
as personal data, data subject, data controller and processor. The interpretation of 
these concepts will be analysed only through the perspective of EU law as that is the 
area of focus of this research.  
1.1.1. Main terms 
Personal data and data subject 
The concept of personal data in EU law was first defined in Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data (hereinafter – Data Protection Directive)1. Article 2(a) of this Directive 
sets:  
'Personal data' shall mean any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an identifiable person is one who 
can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an 
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, 
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.2  
A similar definition can be found in Article 2(a) of the Council of Europe Convention 
for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data (hereinafter – Convention 108)3, which sets that ““personal data” means any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable individual (“data subject”)”4. These 
definitions also incorporate the definition of data subject – any individual. When 
                                           
1 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (Data Protection Directive) OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, pp. 31–50.  
2 Data Protection Directive, Art. 2(a). 
3 Council of Europe. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data (Convention 108). Council of Europe Treaty Series 108 1981. 
4 Convention 108, Art. 2(a). 
 
 
6 
drafting the Data Protection Directive, the EU lawmaker wished to encompass the 
elements already present in the definition in Convention 108, in order to “cover all 
information which may be linked to an individual”5.  
Personal data is any kind of information on an identified or identifiable 
person, for example, name, identity code, or a photograph. Any information can be 
considered personal data if it allows identification of a certain individual. The term is 
thus interpreted very broadly, in order to encompass any kind of information which 
in certain circumstances or by certain individuals could help to identify a person. To 
further understand the concept, it can be explained by analysing the components or 
elements of the definition set in the Data Protection Directive. There are several 
elements: 
 “any information” – this element further emphasizes that any information, 
objective or subjective, true or false, can be considered to be personal data. For 
example, a personal description of an individual, the social or economic 
behaviour of the individual, his appearance, voice, habits, and so on. This has 
also been confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter – 
CJEU), which has set that “the term undoubtedly covers the name of a person in 
conjunction with his telephone coordinates or information about his working 
conditions or hobbies”6. Moreover, the information can be in any form, i.e., it can 
be alphabetical, numerical, graphical, photographical or acoustic.7 
 “relating to” – it is considered that information relates to an individual when it is 
about that individual, even if at first this is not clearly evident.8 For example, 
even if the information is about an object, a particular situation or is in 
combination with other circumstances, the information can relate to a person.  
 “an identified or identifiable” – a natural person can be identified when “within a 
group of persons, he or she is ‘distinguished’ from all other members of the 
group”9, but a person is identifiable, if he or she can be “distinguished”. Thus it is 
irrelevant if the person has already been identified or could possibly be identified 
at some time in the future. In both circumstances information, which can help to 
do so can be considered to be personal data. This element is also further 
explained by the definition in the Data Protection Directive, which sets  
An identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in 
particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors 
specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social 
identity.10 
 “natural person” – it is generally presumed that the Data Protection Directive and 
personal data protection laws in the EU cover protection of data of natural 
persons only. Nevertheless, as MS have the discretion to widen the scope of 
                                           
5 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party. Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data. 
01248/07/EN 
WP 136, p. 4. 
6 CJEU case C-101/01, Criminal proceedings against Bodil Lindqvist, EU:C:2003:596, para. 24. 
7 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party. Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, 
p. 7. 
8 Ibid, p. 8. 
9 Ibid, p. 12. 
10 Data Protection Directive, Art. 2(a). 
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application of the Data Protection Directive in certain aspects, MS can set that 
information on legal persons, deceased persons or unborn children can also be 
considered personal data. Indeed, the Data Protection Directive does not 
explicitly prohibit protection of personal data of legal persons, thus some MS, 
such as Austria, Italy, Luxembourg and, in some aspects, Denmark, provide for 
personal data protection of legal persons.11 As the CJEU has expressed:  
Nothing prevents a Member State from extending the scope of the national 
legislation implementing the provisions of Directive 95/46 to areas not 
included within the scope thereof, provided that no other provision of 
Community law precludes it.12  
This element also illustrates what is understood as a data subject. Thus, depending 
on national data protection regulation, a data subject is a natural person, a deceased 
person, a legal person or an unborn child. 
The definition of personal data may also vary in the national data protection 
legislation of each MS. As mentioned, MS have a discretion to widen the scope of the 
definition. Thus it is possible that the concept of personal data will include different 
elements in each MS. To illustrate, the definition of personal data in the Personal 
Data Protection Law of Latvia is very similar to that in the Data Protection Directive 
and that of Convention 108, setting that personal data is “any information related to 
an identified or identifiable natural person”13. A similar definition can be found in 
Danish personal data legislation (“‘personal data’ shall mean any information relating 
to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’)”14) and the German 
personal data law (““Personal data” means any information concerning the personal 
or material circumstances of an identified or identifiable individual (the data 
subject)”15). But the Personal Data Act of Sweden gives a different definition to 
personal data, stating that personal data is “all kinds of information that directly or 
indirectly may be referable to a natural person who is alive”16. Thus, in Sweden, the 
concept of personal data does not include data on legal entities, deceased persons or 
unborn children.17 
Data controller 
Personal data is usually obtained and processed by a data controller. The Data 
Protection Directive defines a data controller as:  
                                           
11 C. Kuner. European data protection law: corporate compliance and regulation. 2nd edition. 
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 77. 
12 CJEU case C-101/01, Criminal proceedings against Bodil Lindqvist, para. 98. 
13 Parliament of the Republic of Latvia. Personal Data Protection Law of Latvia (23.03.2000), 
Art. 2(3). 
14 Danish Parliament. Act on Processing of Personal Data. Act No. 429 of 31 May 2000, Art. 
3(1). Available at: https://www.datatilsynet.dk/english/the-act-on-processing-of-personal-
data/read-the-act-on-processing-of-personal-data/compiled-version-of-the-act-on-processing-
of-personal-data/ Last visited on 10 March 2017. 
15  German Bundestag. Federal Data Protection Act, Art. 3(1). Available at: 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bdsg/ Last visited on 10 March 2017. 
16  Swedish Parliament. Personal Data Act of Sweden (1998:204), issued 29 April 1998, 
Section 3. 
17 E.W. Hager, A. Niden. “Sweden” in Data Protection & Privacy. Jurisdictional comparisons. 
2nd edition. London: Thomson Reuters, 2014, p. 770. 
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Natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which 
alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the 
processing of personal data; where the purposes and means of processing 
are determined by national or Community laws or regulations, the controller 
or the specific criteria for his nomination may be designated by national or 
Community law.18 
This definition has three main points, which describe what a controller is.  
First, it is set that a controller is a “natural or legal person or any public 
authority, agency or any other body”19. Thus, a controller can be a private or public 
figure and does not need any official nomination or declaration to be considered one. 
But in order to ensure the data subject a greater possibility to refer to a stable entity, 
a legal person will most likely be considered a controller (for example, if data is 
processed within a company, that company will be the controller, rather than the 
employee who carried out the processing).20 Thus, in case of a breach, the natural 
person in charge of processing will most likely not be liable and the company will 
bear the risks. Nevertheless, if a natural person, i.e. an employee of a company, 
were to commence processing data outside the tasks given by the company and for 
his/her own needs, that employee would be considered to be a controller. Thus, in 
order to assess who is the data controller and who bears the liability in case of any 
breaches, it is important to analyse the specific situation and parties involved.  
Second, the definition sets that a controller acts “alone or jointly with 
others”21, meaning it is possible that more than one controller is responsible for 
processing certain data. In situations involving more than one actor who determines 
processing of personal data, all actors should be considered to be data controllers 
and thus subject to the requirements set in the Data Protection Directive and MS 
national data protection laws. As explained by the Working Party on the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data (hereinafter – Article 29 
Working Party or Working Party), ““jointly” must be interpreted as meaning “together 
with” or “not alone” in different forms and combinations”22. 
Third, a data controller is one who “determines the purposes and means of 
the processing of personal data” 23 . Thus, the controller is one who makes the 
decision on which data to collect and for what purposes it will be processed. Indeed, 
the controller is the one who sets all the rules according to which data will be 
processed. The possibility to determine the purposes may arise out of various legal 
or contractual competences. Legal provisions can “imply a certain responsibility”24 to 
collect and process personal data. For example, an employer is usually legally 
required to acquire some information on its employees, thus becoming a data 
controller. Similarly, a contract can also stipulate that one of the contracting parties 
will process the personal data of the other, thus becoming a controller. If there are 
                                           
18 Data Protection Directive, Art. 2(d). 
19 Ibid. 
20 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party. Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of “controller” 
and “processor”. 00264/10/EN WP 169. 
21 Data Protection Directive, Art. 2(d). 
22 Supra note 20. 
23 Data Protection Directive, Art. 2(d). 
24 Supra note 20. 
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no legal, contractual or factual circumstances for determining how and for what 
purposes personal data will be processed, there is no data controller. 
Data processor 
When a data controller has obtained data, it can choose to designate a data 
processor, which will process the data according to the requirements of the 
controller. As Article 2(e) of the Data Protection Directive sets, a data processor is “a 
natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which processes 
personal data on behalf of the controller”25. This definition is very broad, in order to 
cover any natural or legal persons who would process personal data as required by 
the controller and would be subject to the Data Protection Directive. A controller can 
decide to appoint a data processor, if it wishes to, as there are no preconditions for 
when this can be done. If the data processor goes beyond what is required by the 
controller (i.e. processes more data or for other purposes than required), it is no 
longer considered a processer, but rather a joint controller.26 A data processor has to 
observe the requirements under the Data Protection Directive as to the security of 
data processing and observance of the mandate set by the data controller.  
1.1.2. Data protection and right to privacy as different concepts 
In addition to defining personal data, it is important to distinguish this concept from 
that of privacy. Even though the CJEU or European Court of Human Rights 
(hereinafter – ECtHR) has not set a clear distinction between the two concepts, it 
can be argued that they are not one and the same and involve different levels of 
rights protected. It is argued that personal data is a much broader concept than 
privacy as it also relates to other freedoms and rights, and protects data regardless 
of the relationship with privacy.27 Indeed, where privacy could be considered as “the 
right to be left alone”28, data protection encompasses a broader view of possible and 
permissible actions with one’s data. The right to privacy can also be defined as a 
“right which prevents public authorities from measures which are privacy invasive, 
unless certain conditions have been met”29. But data protection strives to “establish 
conditions under which it is legitimate and lawful to process personal data”30. So the 
two concepts are not one and the same. 
Nevertheless, the two concepts are very often interlinked and sometimes 
used as synonyms. Moreover, the link is strengthened by Article 8 of the ECHR, 
which protects the right to private and family life. Indeed, very often the ECtHR has 
                                           
25 Data Protection Directive, Art. 2(e). 
26 Supra note 20. 
27 H. Hijmans. “The European Union as a Constitutional Guardian of Internet Privacy and Data 
Protection: the Story of Article 16 TFEU” (PhD diss. Faculty of Law at the University of 
Amsterdam and Faculty Law and Criminology at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 2016), p. 67. 
(Hijmans, 2016) 
28  J.S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner, A. Ward. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: a 
commentary. Oxford; Hart Publishing, 2014, p. 228. 
29  European Data Protection Supervisor. Legislation. Available at: 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/cache/offonce/EDPS/Dataprotection/Legislatio
n Last visited on 10 March 2017. 
30 Ibid. 
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also interpreted this right to cover the right to data protection.31 The ECtHR has in 
multiple cases applied Article 8 in order to ascertain whether the right to personal 
data protection has been breached, thus clearly indicating that it considers data 
protection as one of the rights protected by the wording of Article 8 of the ECHR.32 
Similarly, the CJEU has often used the concept of data protection and privacy as one 
and the same right, referring to Article 7 (respect for private and family life) and 8 
(protection of personal data) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union33 (hereinafter – Charter) simultaneously. For example, in Volker und Markus 
Schecke the Court set:  
it must be considered that the right to respect for private life with regard to 
the processing of personal data, recognised by Articles 7 and 8 of the 
Charter, concerns any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
individual [...] and the limitations which may lawfully be imposed on the right 
to the protection of personal data correspond to those tolerated in relation to 
Article 8 of the Convention.34  
It stated similarly in Michael Schwarz v Stadt Bochum, indicating that it considers 
both articles in a “joint reading”35. But the CJEU is not consistent in referring to both 
Articles. In Deutsche Telekom AG v Bundesrepublik Deutschland it referred only to 
Article 8 in order to analyse lawful processing of personal data.36 But in Ryneš, when 
looking at the legitimacy of processing personal data, the CJEU referred only to 
Article 7 of the Charter.37 Thus, the CJEU has refrained from clearly distinguishing 
the two rights. 
 But, when discussing EU law, some authors consider that data protection and 
privacy are not synonyms. It is argued that the concept of privacy involves the 
notion of informational self-determination, meaning a person’s right to determine for 
himself when, how and to what extent information about him is communicated to 
others.38 This notion is not in accordance with what EU law understands as data 
protection. Indeed, self-determination or consent to data processing is only one of 
the grounds for legitimate data processing under EU law. Nevertheless, the 
secondary law of the EU also provides for other grounds for processing, by 
evaluating the legitimate interests of the data subject and the data controller and 
thus ensuring lawful processing without personal consent. 39  Thus, even though 
                                           
31 ECtHR. Amann v. Switzerland. Case No. 27798/95, 16 February 2000; ECtHR. Taylor-Sabori 
v. the United Kingdom. Case No. 47114/99, 22 October 2002; ECtHR. M.S. v. Sweden. Case 
No. 74/1996/693/885, 27 August 1997. 
32 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. “Handbook on European data protection 
law”, p. 37. Available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Handbook_data_ 
protection_ENG.pdf  Last visited on 10 March 2017. 
33 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter), OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, pp. 
391–407. 
34 CJEU joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR (C-92/09) and 
Hartmut Eifert (C-93/09) v Land Hessen, EU:C:2010:662, para. 52. 
35 CJEU case C-291/12, Michael Schwarz v Stadt Bochum, EU:C:2013:670, para. 25. 
36 CJEU case C-543/09, Deutsche Telekom AG v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, EU:C:2011:279, 
para. 49.-53. 
37 CJEU case C-212/13, František Ryneš v Úřad pro ochranu osobních údajů, EU:C:2014:2428, 
para. 29. 
38 Supra note 28, p. 229. 
39 Ibid. 
 
 
11 
privacy and data protection are closely interlinked, data protection goes beyond the 
right to privacy and should be considered as a separate right. 
1.2. Applicable legal norms 
As this research focuses on EU law, it is important to analyse the legal norms which 
govern data protection in the EU. Data protection provisions are present in the 
Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter – TFEU)40 and the 
Charter, as well as other more specific legal norms, such as directives and 
regulations on various data protection matters. Currently, the main legal instrument 
for personal data protection in the EU is the Data Protection Directive. It should be 
stressed that this research aims to analyse the correlation and relationship with 
national and EU institutions in terms of data protection. Thus, EU legal norms 
regulating data protection within EU institutions and bodies will not be analysed in 
detail, and a more detailed analysis will be aimed at other legal norms which govern 
the above mentioned relationship. Other EU legal norms in the area of personal data 
protection include, firstly, Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on 
the free movement of such data (Regulation 45/2001)41, which applies only to data 
protection and processing rules within the EU institutions and does not concern 
cooperation with MS institutions. This document will be briefly analysed in Chapter 
1.3.4, when analysing the European Data Protection Supervisor – the official data 
protection authority in the EU. Secondly, the author will also not analyse in detail 
Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector (hereinafter – e-Privacy Directive)42 (as amended in 
2009 by EU Directive 2009/136/EC43). The e-Privacy Directive does not refer to the 
competences or obligations of national or EU institutions and should be considered 
as complementing and particularizing the Data Protection Directive44 in the electronic 
communications sector. 
Additionally, it must be stressed that at the moment of this research 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
                                           
40 Consolidated version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). OJ C 
326, 26.10.2012, pp. 47–390. 
41 Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 
2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by the 
Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data (Regulation 
45/2001), OJ L 8/1, 12.1.2011. 
42  Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (e-Privacy Directive), OJ L 201, 31/07/2002, pp. 0037-0047. 
43 Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 
2009 amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to 
electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications 
sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities 
responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws, OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, pp. 11–
36. 
44 E-Privacy Directive, Art. 1(2). 
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2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
(hereinafter – General Data Protection Regulation)45 has just been adopted, so the 
author will also address this legal instrument. Moreover, it is important to briefly 
analyse the different national data protection laws of MS in terms of the 
competences of national data protection agencies (hereinafter – DPAs), as they may 
illustrate the different approaches and levels of competences attributed to national 
and EU institutions and bodies.  
1.2.1. Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union  
Article 16 of the TFEU prescribes the general right to personal data protection to 
everyone and it reads as follows:  
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them. 
2. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure, shall lay down the rules relating to the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by 
Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and by the Member States 
when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of Union law, and the 
rules relating to the free movement of such data. Compliance with these 
rules shall be subject to the control of independent authorities.46 
This Article illustrates that the EU has recognized personal data protection as a 
fundamental right and coincides with Article 8 of the Charter. This provision sets data 
protection as a fundamental right of EU law and “elevates the provision on data 
protection to a 'provision of general application' under Title II alongside other 
fundamental principles of the EU”47. So even if personal data processing takes place 
within one MS, the EU has set that is has to be protected as a fundamental right.   
The second part of Article 16 sets the obligations of EU institutions to 
legislate in the area of personal data protection. It sets the mandate of EU 
institutions to adopt legislation on data protection, also leaving room for MS to adopt 
national legislation. This part establishes protection of personal data within EU 
institutions and other bodies and within each MS. So the EU legislator adopts the 
main tasks of both EU and national authorities to ensure effective fulfilment of Article 
16(1) of the TFEU, but their execution is left to the MS, in so far as EU law allows. 
The last sentence of Article 16(2) provides that the independent authorities (meaning 
national DPA’s) must oversee these rules. As confirmed by the CJEU in European 
Commission v Republic of Austria and European Commission v Federal Republic of 
Germany in relation to the independence of national DPA’s, MS can lay down the 
specific regulatory framework to ensure effective protection of personal data as 
envisaged by the EU.  
                                           
45 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on 
the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation), OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, pp. 1–88. 
46 TFEU, Art. 16.  
47  F. Ferretti. “A European Perspective on Data Processing Consent through the Re-
conceptualization of European Data Protection's Looking Glass after the Lisbon Treaty: Taking 
Rights Seriously”. European Review of Private Law, 2-2012, p. 480. 
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1.2.2. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
With adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter has been granted the same legal 
status as primary law of the EU, as prescribed by Article 6 of the Treaty of the 
European Union (hereinafter – TEU). One of the fundamental rights protected by the 
Charter is personal data protection. Article 8 of the Charter sets:  
1.   Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him 
or her. 
2.   Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the 
basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis 
laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data, which has been 
collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified. 
3.  Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent 
authority.48  
It is important to stress that unlike in the ECHR, data protection has been set as a 
separate fundamental right from private and family life (Article 7 of the Charter). It is 
even argued that no UN human rights convention addresses data protection as a 
specific provision, but merely deduces this right from the right to privacy.49 Thus, it is 
a clear statement and signal from the EU legislator that personal data is a specific 
right which requires protection. Article 8 of the Charter is in some way similar to 
Article 16 of the TFEU, firstly, providing that data protection is a fundamental right 
and, secondly, emphasizing that compliance with the respective norm should be 
overseen by an independent authority, meaning national DPAs. This has also been 
reconfirmed by the CJEU in European Commission v Republic of Austria, where the 
Court established that  
the requirement that compliance with European Union rules on the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data is subject to 
control by an independent authority derives from the primary law of the 
European Union, inter alia Article 8(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union and Article 16(2) TFEU.50  
As discussed in Chapter 1.1.2 of this research, Article 8 of the Charter is commonly 
used by the CJEU in order to emphasize the importance of data protection in the EU. 
It is argued that with adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and the Charter becoming a part 
of EU primary law, the CJEU has substantially expanded protection of rights to data 
privacy, using the Charter as the legal basis for ensuring the level of protection.51 
                                           
48 Charter, Art. 8. 
49 D. McGoldrick. “The Charter and United Nations Human Rights Treaties” in Peers, S., Ward, 
A. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Politics, Law and Policy. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2004, p. 112. 
50 CJEU case C-614/10, European Commission v Republic of Austria, EU:C:2012:631, para. 
36. 
51 F. Fabbrini. “The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Rights to Data Privacy: The EU 
Court of Justice as a Human Rights Court” in Vries, S., Bernitz, U., Weatherhill, S. The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights as a Binding Instrument: Five Years Old and Growing. Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2015, p. 218. 
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1.2.3. EU Data Protection Directive 
The Data Protection Directive is considered to be the main EU legal instrument on 
personal data protection. It defines what personal data is, what can or cannot be 
done with such data and, moreover, which national and EU institutions are 
competent to act in the field of data protection.  
 The Data Protection Directive was adopted in 1995, when only 1% of the EU 
population was using the Internet and such companies as Facebook, Twitter or 
Google were not yet operating.52 Thus, it cannot be considered a modern piece of 
legislation, and possibly it does not effectively ensure data protection in today’s 
context. Nevertheless, the CJEU is using its powers to interpret the legislation so it 
would be possible to apply its provisions to current issues. Upon implementation of 
the Directive, the MS were allowed some room for manoeuvre and the possibility to 
introduce specific rules. This possibility has been recognized by the CJEU, stating 
that it can be done if the provisions of the Directive have so provided and only if it is 
done in accordance with the Directive’s objective – “maintaining a balance between 
the free movement of personal data and the protection of private life”53. MS have 
used this opportunity to “adapt” the Directive to the national specifics of their data 
protection laws and, thus, currently data protection legislation varies across the EU. 
 The Data Protection Directive has a very broad scope of application. As Article 
3(1) of the Directive sets, it is applicable to any kind of processing of personal data 
(wholly or partially, using automatic means or otherwise). Article 3(2) of the 
Directive sets when it is not applicable – firstly, when the processing falls outside of 
Community law or is in any case related to public security, defence or any activities 
of the State in areas of criminal law, and secondly, when processing is carried out by 
a natural person for purely personal or household needs. 54  As Advocate General 
Kokott has set in her opinion in Satamedia, the Directive has such a broad scope of 
application, “which already reaches almost beyond the establishment of the internal 
market”55. 
 The Data Protection Directive sets the obligation on MS to set up an 
independent national DPA which would serve certain functions and have certain 
powers. This aspect of the Directive will be analysed in Chapter 1.3.2.  
1.2.4. General Data Protection Regulation 
On 4 May 2016 the General Data Protection Regulation was published in the EU 
Official Journal. This regulation will substitute the Data Protection Directive and will 
create single data protection legislation in all EU MS. Work on this regulation has 
been extensive and long, as the first announcement from the European Commission 
as to the need for such regulation was in 2010.56 The norms of the General Data 
                                           
52 O. Lynskey. The foundations of EU data protection law. New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2015, p. 4. 
53 CJEU case C-101/01, Criminal proceedings against Bodil Lindqvist, para. 97. 
54 Data Protection Directive, Art. 3(2). 
55 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C-73/07, Tietosuojavaltuutettu v Satakunnan 
Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy, EU:C:2008:266, para. 53.  
56  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A comprehensive 
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Protection Regulation are more complex and elaborate and introduce new concepts 
in data protection legislation as well as establishing new data protection bodies. As 
this research focuses on competences and their division among EU and national 
institutions and bodies, it is important to illustrate the main changes in this area 
following the entry into force of the General Data Protection Regulation. This analysis 
is contained in Chapter 3.3 of the research. 
1.2.5. National data protection laws 
As mentioned before, the national legal norms of data protection in EU MS vary 
slightly. As the Data Protection Directive has been implemented differently, there are 
currently 28 different data protection regulations in the EU. For the purposes of this 
research, the author will not analyse the different provisions relating to the concepts 
of data protection, but will focus on the main differences in terms of competences of 
data protection authorities.  
In general, the strictness of data protection norms varies greatly among MS. 
In such states as France, Germany, Spain and Belgium, data protection is heavily 
regulated, but in “newer” MS such as Lithuania, the level is rather moderate.57 The 
differences can be seen both in the wording and scope of legal norms, as well as the 
administrative set-up for monitoring compliance. For example, most EU MS have one 
DPA, which administers data protection issues. Nevertheless, Germany has a DPA for 
each federal unit, each supervised by the Federal Data Protection Commissioner. 
Additionally, the legal setup of national DPAs is different – for example, in Finland, 
the national DPA consists of a Data Protection Ombudsman that cooperates and 
refers matters to the Data Protection Board, which can then act further on matters 
referred to the Ombudsman. 58  Thus, the competences attributed to the national 
authority may vary depending on national legislation. 
A common position for MS data protection laws is that the DPA has the 
competence and right to start an investigation upon receiving a complaint from a 
data subject or upon suspicions of violation. 59  Moreover, as the Data Protection 
Directive provides for an obligation to cooperate with other DPAs, this aspect is 
observed in all MS, but not strictly regulated and without specific provisions in this 
regard. The consequences of a breach are rather different in terms of type of liability 
(administrative or criminal) and the amount of fines applicable. A large part of MS 
data protection rules provide for an administrative penalty.60 But some MS, such as 
Belgium, France, Denmark, Finland, Italy and Germany, have established a possibility 
of criminal liability for certain violations of personal data protection. Thus, the 
                                                                                                                         
approach on personal data protection in the European Union. 4 November 2010, COM (2010) 
609. 
57  DLA Piper. Data Protection Laws of the World. Available at: 
https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/#handbook/world-map-section Last visited on 10 
March 2017. 
58 Ibid. 
59 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Data Protection in the European Union, 
the role of National Data Protection Authorities, p. 21. Available at: 
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/815-Data-protection_en.pdf Last visited 
on 10 March 2017. 
60 For example, data protection regulation of Latvia, Austria, Hungary, Ireland.  
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competences for imposing certain penalties and fines are different among MS and 
vary depending on the type of breach. In addition, the types of breaches and the 
penalty amounts are also rather different and can range from several hundred euros 
(for example, the maximum penalty in Lithuania is 579 euros)61 to several thousand 
euros for each day of breach 62 . France has especially large penalties and legal 
persons can be fined up to 1.5 million euro.63  
Such disparities and different approaches to data protection can cause 
several issues in terms of cooperation and competences of national MS in cross-
border situations. Data controllers can choose to establish themselves in a MS which 
has more relaxed legal norms, thus furthering forum shopping. Additionally, following 
Weltimmo, one violation can be investigated and penalised in different MS, thus 
applying different data protection laws and reaching different conclusions. This can 
fail to ensure uniform application of EU law and the duty of sincere cooperation as 
well as creating lack of legal certainty. Moreover, as interpretations of violations vary, 
the same violation can be interpreted as a criminal offence or just administrative 
liability. This aspect will be analysed in more detail in Chapter 3.2. 
1.3. Competent EU and MS institutions and bodies 
1.3.1. European Commission 
The European Commission is the executive body of the EU. As such it is responsible 
for proposing legislation, adopting new agreements, implementing EU policies and 
managing overall operations of the EU. The duties, obligations and competences of 
the Commission are established in Article 17 of the TEU. In terms of personal data 
protection, the European Commission provides proposals for new legislative acts in 
data protection, serves as the communicator with third countries, negotiates 
agreements concluded with third countries and adopts adequacy decisions. 64  For 
example, the Commission is the body which proposed the newly adopted General 
Data Protection Regulation and which communicated with the United States of 
America over the new framework for data transfer outside the EU, following the 
invalidity of the “safe harbour” regime. According to Article 25 of the Data Protection 
Directive, the Commission plays a very important role in establishing the framework 
for personal data transfer outside the EU.65 
The Commission has the power to commence infringement proceedings 
against a MS in case of breach of EU data protection rules. This power has been 
                                           
61 Supra note 57. 
62 In the case of Belgium, where the national DPA administered a daily fine of EUR 200,000 to 
Facebook for noncompliance with national data protection rules. See Commission for the 
Protection of Privacy of Belgium. Judgment in the Facebook case. Available at: 
https://www.privacycommission.be/en/news/judgment-facebook-case. Last visited on 10 
March 2017. 
63 Supra note 57. 
64 M. Kuschewsky. “European Union” in Data Protection & Privacy. Jurisdictional comparisons, 
p. 262. 
65  According to Art. 25(4) of the Data Protection Directive, the Commission has the 
competence to determine if a third country can ensure adequate levels of protection and Art. 
25(4) sets that the Commission can enter into negotiations with that third country, if 
necessary. 
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exercised mostly in cases regarding MS failure to ensure complete independence of 
the national DPA, as required by the Data Protection Directive.66 Additionally, the 
Commission has the power to evaluate if third countries can ensure adequate levels 
of data protection, thus creating the so-called “white list” of states, where the level 
of data protection is in line with EU law requirements.67 Once the Commission has 
issued a decision on the level of protection, MS are required to comply with it. 
Nevertheless, following the CJEU ruling in Schrems national DPAs have the discretion 
to review Commission decisions if a claim is brought disputing the credibility or 
legality of the decision.68 This was done by the German DPAs, which collectively 
adopted the view that other grounds for transfer of personal data outside the EU had 
to also be considered invalid and contradicted the position of the Commission.69 
Under the newly adopted General Data Protection Regulation, the Commission  
obtains extensive policymaking powers through the possibility of adopting 
delegated acts and implementing measures in numerous instances, including 
by specifying standard forms, procedures and mechanisms.70  
Changes following adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation will be 
analysed in Chapter 3.3. 
1.3.2. National Data Protection Agencies 
The requirement for setting up a national DPA is established in both primary and 
secondary EU law. Article 16(2) of the TFEU and Article 8 of the Charter both refer to 
the requirement for an independent national authority. In addition, Article 28 of the 
Data Protection Directive sets the specific obligation for MS to create such 
authorities. The administrative framework can be specified by the MS themselves, so 
there are many differences in the setup, management and running of national 
DPAs.71 It can be said that the national DPAs are a governmental institution between 
the EU and MS, ensuring protection of both EU law and national law, while 
nevertheless remaining independent. Their position can be considered hybrid, as 
they are attached both to the national legal system as well as that of the EU.72  
Article 28(3) sets the powers of national DPAs. First, they have the power to 
investigate claims, collect information and require access to data in order to perform 
                                           
66 For example, CJEU case C-518/07, European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany, 
EU:C:2010:125; CJEU case C-614/10, European Commission v Republic of Austria; CJEU case 
C-288/12, European Commission v Hungary, EU:C:2014:237. 
67 Supra note 64, p. 272. 
68 CJEU case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, EU:C:2015:650, 
para. 65-66. 
69 C. Ritzer, C. Zieger, D. Ashkar, M. Evans. “German Data Protection Authorities Suspend 
BCR approvals, question Model Clause transfers.” Available at: 
http://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2015/10/german-data-protection-authorities-suspend-
bcr-approvals-question-model-clause-transfers/. Last visited on 10 March 2017. 
70 Supra note 64, p. 263. 
71 P. Schütz. “Comparing formal independence of data protection authorities in selected EU 
Member States”. Available at: http://regulation.upf.edu/exeter-12-papers/Paper%20265%20-
%20Schuetz%202012%20-
%20Comparing%20formal%20independence%20of%20data%20protection%20authorities%
20in%20selected%20EU%20Member%20States.pdf  Last visited on 10 March 2017. 
72 Hijmans, 2016, p. 287. 
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their supervisory duties.73 Second, DPAs have effective powers of intervention, such 
as issuing opinions (also authorizing data processing, if required), ordering the 
blocking of data processing, erasure or destruction of data or any other temporary or 
permanent ban on processing for the controller, as well as referring matters to 
national political institutions. 74  Third, the Data Protection Directive gives national 
DPAs the power to engage in legal proceedings when there have been violations of 
national data protection norms or bring violations to the attention of judicial 
authorities.75 
Article 28(1) of the Data Protection Directive sets the obligation to ensure the 
independence of national DPAs. Independence is a crucial aspect in data protection 
regulation in the EU, as it is also present in Article 8 of the Charter as well as in 
Article 16(2) of the TFEU. It is further emphasized by the CJEU in multiple cases, 
where the court has strictly interpreted this provision stating that the principle of 
independent national DPAs is crucial. In Commission v Germany, the Court analysed 
if the state’s supervision of a DPA which monitored the processing of non-public 
sector data in a specific region is an intrusion and violation of the independence 
principle. The CJEU concluded that this principle 
precludes not only any influence exercised by the supervised bodies, but also 
any directions or any other external influence, whether direct or indirect, 
which could call into question the performance by those authorities of their 
task consisting of establishing a fair balance between the protection of the 
right to private life and the free movement of personal data.76 
Thus, the Court has clearly indicated that national DPAs must be independent in all 
aspects, in order to guarantee that their performance and decisions are not 
influenced by external actors. In this case the CJEU affirmed that state intervention 
is contrary to the requirement of independence set in Article 28(1) of the Data 
Protection Directive. A similar conclusion was derived in Commission v Hungary, 
where the Court assessed whether removing the Hungarian Data Protection 
Supervisor from his position before the expiry of his term is considered a breach of 
the requirement of independence according to Article 28(1) of the Data Protection 
Directive. Here the CJEU set that such action too should be considered a violation of 
the requirement of independence as  
the threat of such premature termination to which that authority would be 
exposed throughout its term of office could lead it to enter into a form of 
prior compliance with the political authority, which is incompatible with the 
requirement of independence.77 
This case law confirms the CJEU’s position on the strict requirement of independent 
national DPAs. Only with a high level of independence can the right to personal data 
protection be ensured throughout the EU, without threats of intrusion from the state 
or political authorities. The requirement of independence is one of the main issues 
which arises when discussing the competences and level of cooperation between 
                                           
73 Data Protection Directive, Art. 28(3). 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 
76 CJEU case C-518/07, European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany, para. 30. 
77 CJEU case C-288/12, European Commission v Hungary, para. 54. 
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national DPAs, national parliaments and EU institutions. This aspect will be analysed 
in detail in Chapter 3. 
 Clearly, national DPAs play a crucial role in the area of personal data 
protection in the EU. MS are obliged to ensure the existence of DPAs and EU primary 
law establishes them as bodies of a constitutional nature. This means that DPAs have 
to ensure cooperation between the EU and their respective national institutions, as 
well as cooperate with each other. This duty is also stressed by the CJEU and further 
emphasized in the General Data Protection Regulation, as discussed in Chapter 3.  
1.3.3. CJEU 
As the CJEU is one of the fundamental institutions of the EU and by itself could be a 
subject of an article, the author will analyse only the role of the CJEU in terms of 
personal data protection and its contribution in ascertaining the competences of 
national and EU institutions and bodies.  
 Professor Hijmans has set three main functions of the CJEU in matters of 
personal data processing, deriving them from Sweet’s three functions of the 
constitutional role.78 Firstly, as Article 19(1) of the TEU sets, the CJEU serves as the 
interpreter of EU legal norms and ensures their uniform application. It acts as a 
constitutional court which balances the relationship and powers between the EU and 
MS, thus developing constitutional principles of judicial review.79 So the Court has the 
obligation to ensure that legal norms are interpreted correctly, in line with 
fundamental rights and general principles of EU law.  
Secondly, the CJEU ensures that MS are committed to their integration 
according to the Treaties, meaning that the Court ensures that MS comply with their 
obligations under EU law. 80  This can be seen in many personal data processing 
cases, for example ASNEF and FECEMD, where the Court precluded a MS from 
introducing additional provisions on legitimate grounds for personal data processing, 
which would be contrary to the Data Protection Directive.81  
Thirdly, the CJEU is an “intermediary” in cases, when the EU or MS are 
overstepping their competences or introducing legal norms which are outside their 
competence. For example, this could be seen in Digital Rights Ireland. In this case, 
the Court was asked to evaluate a certain provision of Directive 2006/24/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on retention of data 
generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available 
electronic communications services or of public communications networks and 
amending Directive 2002/58/EC (Data Retention Directive)82. Instead, the Court set 
                                           
78 Hijmans, 2016, p. 169.; S.A. Sweet. “The European Court of Justice” in P. Craig, G. de 
Burca. The evolution of EU law. 2nd edition. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, 
p. 121. 
79 Hijmans, 2016, p. 169. 
80 Ibid. 
81  CJEU joined cases C-468/10 and C-469/10, Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos 
Financieros de Crédito (ASNEF), Federación de Comercio Electrónico y Marketing Directo 
(FECEMD) v. Administración del Estado, EU:C:2011:777, para. 48-49. 
82 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on 
the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly 
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that this Directive as such is contrary to Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter and declared 
it invalid as the EU legislator had “exceeded the limits imposed by compliance with 
the principle of proportionality in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter.” 
83 The Court’s role as an intermediary could also be seen in Weltimmo, where the 
Court established the jurisdiction of national DPAs if a violation involves more than 
one MS data protection rules.84  
 Given that the Data Protection Directive is a rather outdated law, the CJEU 
has in recent years served as gap-filler in order to address modern problems. This is 
a very positive aspect as personal data processing is an area which develops day by 
day. It is crucial that a powerful institution such as CJEU can ensure legal certainty 
and effective judicial review of new problems, thus taking the role of an activist in 
personal data protection. Presumably, the Court will need to take this role also in the 
future following implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation. Given 
that law-making in the EU is not a very speedy process, inevitably the legislator will 
not be able to address new problems associated with means of data processing, new 
technologies and new businesses in short order. Thus, the CJEU will need to address 
these problems by interpreting new legal norms.  
1.3.4. European Data Protection Supervisor  
The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) is an independent European 
supervisory authority, established in 2004 in accordance with Article 286 of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community 85  and derives its legal basis in 
Regulation 45/2001. Even though the EDPS is an important EU body in the area of 
data protection, it is an internal EU body which concerns personal data protection 
within EU institutions. Indeed, it acts as the DPA of the EU as an administrative 
body. Thus, as the purpose of this research is to analyse competences between EU 
and national institutions, the actions and competences of the EDPS will only be 
analysed from this perspective. 
 The EDPS was established in order to serve as an independent intra-EU DPA. 
As Regulation 45/2001 sets, the main tasks of the EDPS are to monitor data 
processing by EU institutions, ensure application of Regulation 45/2001 and any 
other EU legal norms that ensure protection of fundamental rights and freedoms in 
terms of data processing, and advise EU institutions, bodies and data subjects on all 
matters relating to personal data protection.86 Additionally, the representative of the 
EDPS is a member of the Article 29 Working Party and thus participates in issuing 
opinions on various topics relating to personal data processing in the EU. 
                                                                                                                         
available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and 
amending Directive 2002/58/EC (Data Retention Directive), OJ L 105, 13.4.2006, pp. 54–63. 
83 CJEU joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd (C-293/12) v Minister 
for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Kärntner 
Landesregierung (C-594/12) and Others, EU:C:2014:238, para. 69. 
84 CJEU case C-230/14, Weltimmo s. r. o. v Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság 
Hatóság, EU:C:2015:639.  
85  Treaty establishing the European Community (Consolidated version 2002), OJ C 325, 
24.12.2002, pp. 33–184. 
86 Regulation 45/2001, Art. 41(2). 
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 The EDPS is subject to the same requirement of independence as national 
DPAs (see Chapter 1.3.2). Even though it has no direct link to national DPAs,87 Article 
46(f)(i) of Regulation 45/2001 sets the obligation to the EDPS to cooperate with 
national DPAs:  
to the extent necessary for the performance of their respective duties, in 
particular by exchanging all useful information, requesting such authority or 
body to exercise its powers or responding to a request from such authority or 
body.88  
The EDPS is a part of the institutional cooperation mechanism and represents the EU 
perspective and thus operates very closely with the Article 29 Working Party. 89 
Moreover, if the European Commission has brought an infringement procedure to the 
CJEU, the EDPS serves as a supporter of the European Commission and EU position. 
The role of the EDPS in cooperation with the national authorities is analysed in detail 
in Chapter 3.1.2. 
1.3.5. Article 29 Working Party 
The Article 29 Working Party is an independent EU advisory body on personal data 
protection. As can be derived from the name, the Article 29 Working Party is 
established by Article 29(1) of the Data Protection Directive, which reads:  
The Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data, hereinafter referred to as 'the Working Party', is 
hereby set up. It shall have advisory status and act independently.90  
The Article 29 Working Party is composed of the representatives of national DPAs of 
each MS, as well as representatives of the EU data protection authority (EDPS) and a 
representative of the European Commission.91 The main tasks of the Working Party 
are set in Article 30 of the Data Protection Directive as well as the Rules of Procedure 
of the Working Party92 and Article 15(3) of the e-Privacy Directive. 
The first task, set in Article 30(1)(a) of the Data Protection Regulation is to  
examine any question covering the application of the national measures 
adopted under this Directive in order to contribute to the uniform application 
of such measures,93  
thus giving explanations and interpretations of the provisions of the Data Protection 
Directive so as to ensure uniform application. Next, the Working Party must give 
opinions to the European Commission regarding the “level of protection in the 
Community and in third countries”94. The Working Party issues opinions regarding 
the level of personal data protection in the EU as well as any third country, which is 
necessary, for example, for a data controller in order to ensure that transferring data 
                                           
87 Hijmans, 2016, p. 353. 
88 Supra note 86, Art. 46(f)(i). 
89 Supra note 87, p. 354. 
90 Data Protection Directive, Art. 29(1). 
91 Ibid, Art. 29(2). 
92 Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data. Rules of Procedure. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-
29/files/rules-art-29_en.pdf. Last visited on 10 March 2017. 
93 Data Protection Directive, Art. 30(1)(a). 
94 Ibid, Art. 30(1)(b).  
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to a third state is safe and in line with EU standards. Additionally, the Working Party 
is an advisory body which gives advice to the Commission on amendments to the 
Data Protection Directive or any other legal norm regarding personal data protection 
and ensuring observance of rights and freedoms of natural persons regarding 
personal data processing.95 Furthermore, the Working Party also issues opinions on 
codes of conduct prepared at the EU level.  
This institution gives opinions and communications on topical data protection 
issues, as well as interpreting and clarifying EU data protection legislation. Given that 
it is similar to a forum of representatives of national DPAs and EU data protection 
institutions, it serves as a guiding institution in all matters related to data protection. 
The core objectives of the Working Party are to (a) provide expert opinion on 
matters relating to data protection from MS level to the Commission, as well as 
provide such opinions to EU institutions and bodies and the general public, (b) 
promote uniform application of the norms envisaged in EU legal norms regarding 
data protection and encourage cooperation between national DPAs, (c) advise EU 
institutions on measures which could affect the rights and freedoms of persons 
regarding the processing of their personal data.96 
Even though the opinions of the Working Party are not binding, they are well 
used by the European Commission, the CJEU and national DPAs. For example, the 
Latvian DPA uses the guidelines and opinions of the Working Party for their own 
information materials, such as publications and explanatory notes on several data 
processing concepts. 97  Thus, this institution’s opinions are crucial in shaping the 
existing data protection area of EU law and ensuring uniform application of EU data 
protection rules in MS. But the legal setup and non-binding nature of the Working 
Party can cause certain issues in relation to cooperation between national and EU 
data protection authorities. This will be further analysed in Chapter 3.1.2.   
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96  Tasks of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party. Available at: 
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2. DIVISION OF COMPETENCES IN THE AREA OF DATA 
PROTECTION  
2.1. Concept of shared competence in EU law 
The EU as a legal formation is based on attributed competence, meaning it can act 
only as far as the Treaties allow it. As set in Article 5(2) of the Treaty on European 
Union (hereinafter – TEU):  
Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits of 
the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to 
attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the 
Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.98 
So, the EU can only act so far as MS have given it the competence to act. In general, 
the TFEU provides for three types of competences for the EU – exclusive 
competence, shared competence and supporting / co-ordinating competence. In this 
research, the focus will be on shared competence, as personal data protection falls 
within this area.  
Article 2(2) of the TFEU prescribes that  
When the Treaties confer on the Union a competence shared with the 
Member States in a specific area, the Union and the Member States may 
legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area. The Member States shall 
exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its 
competence. The Member States shall again exercise their competence to the 
extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence.99  
This Article defines what is understood as shared competence in the area of EU law. 
It is considered that all matters which are not specified in Articles 3 and 6 of the 
TFEU (dealing with exclusive and supporting/coordinating competences, 
respectively), shall be considered to fall within the area of shared competence.100 As 
Craig has put it, “shared competence is a default position in the Lisbon Treaty”101. In 
the particular case of data protection, Article 16 of the TFEU has provided that the 
EU legislator shall have the competence to legislate in certain areas of data 
protection, leaving MS with some room for manoeuvre. Moreover, as data protection 
is not listed as an area of exclusive or supporting/coordinating competences, it is 
considered as a shared competence. Data protection is a  
competence which the Union shares with the Member States and which it 
exercises with due regard for the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.102 
As Article 2(2) of the TFEU states, the MS possibility to act is pre-empted by actions 
already taken by the EU, meaning the MS may act only so far as the EU has not 
                                           
98 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, pp. 
13–390, Art. 5(2). 
99 TFEU, Art. 2(2). 
100 P. Craig. EU Administrative Law. 2nd edition. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012, p. 377. 
101 P. Craig, G. de Burca. EU Law. Text, cases and materials. 6th edition. Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 102. 
102 Hijmans, 2016, p. 117. 
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acted. In fact, there are several different ways in which MS and the EU may share 
competence to act. Firstly, a MS will only lose its competence to act if the EU has 
exercised its competence to act. It is said, “legislative instruments of the Union, once 
adopted and entered into force, have a blocking effect on the competences of the 
Member States”103. Thus, once the EU acts (i.e. adopts legislation in a certain area), 
the MS lose their competence to act. Any national measure adopted by a MS will 
thus be invalid. As in the case of data protection, the EU has adopted the Data 
Protection Directive, so that MS are precluded from adopting such legislative acts on 
data protection which would be contrary to this directive, of course with the 
exception of measures needed to transpose it into their national law. Nevertheless, 
MS competence is lost only to the extent that the EU has exercised its competence. 
As set in Protocol No 25 of the TFEU, 
When the Union has taken action in a certain area, the scope of this exercise 
of competence only covers those elements governed by the Union act in 
question and therefore does not cover the whole area.104  
Thus, the EU may only act to a certain extent, leaving MS with the possibility to act 
further. For example, the EU legislator may harmonize a particular area only 
minimally or only in a certain aspect, thus leaving the MS with room for action in that 
particular area.105 Such is the case of the Data Protection Directive, which gives the 
MS the possibility to adopt stricter national norms. As the CJEU has set in Lindqvist 
and Huber:  
The approximation of the national laws applicable in this area must not result 
in any lessening of the protection they afford but must, on the contrary, seek 
to ensure a high level of protection in the Community.106 
Nevertheless, the Court has set that MS are precluded from “adding” norms, which 
would be contrary to the Data Protection Directive – they may only “provide for a 
mere clarification”107 of the principles set in the directive. 
Further, the EU may (if the provisions of the TFEU provide for it) adopt 
further legislation in a particular area or, alternatively, cease the exercise of 
competence altogether. In that case, the MS would regain all competence in the 
particular area. As of adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation, it can 
certainly be expected that the MS will only lose more competence in the area of data 
protection. 
Shared competence must be carried out in respect to principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality, as well as the principle of sincere cooperation. These principles 
provide for the pathway which has to be followed when exercising shared 
competence.  
                                           
103 Ibid, p. 121.  
104 Sole Article of the Protocol (No 25) of the TFEU on the exercise of shared competence, OJ 
C 326, 26.10.2012. 
105 P. Craig. EU Administrative Law, p. 379. 
106 CJEU case C-101/01, Criminal proceedings against Bodil Lindqvist, para. 95; CJEU case C-
524/06, Heinz Huber v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, EU:C:2008:724, para. 50. 
107  CJEU joined cases C-468/10 and C-469/10, Asociación Nacional de Establecimientos 
Financieros de Crédito (ASNEF), Federación de Comercio Electrónico y Marketing Directo 
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2.1.1. Principle of subsidiarity and proportionality 
There are several basic principles which MSs and the EU must observe when dealing 
with issues that fall within shared competence. When exercising powers to act in an 
area of shared competence, the EU and MSs must observe the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. As established by Article 5(3) of the TEU,  
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its 
exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can 
rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved at Union level.108 
So, the principle of subsidiarity provides that EU will abstain from any legislative 
action if the objectives of this legislation can be achieved more effectively at MS 
level.  
This Article must be read in conjunction with Protocol No 2 of the TFEU, 
which sets how this principle must be applied. The principle applies to draft 
legislative acts only and prescribes that the European Commission must consult 
widely before proposing legislative acts.109 Most importantly, this principle provides 
that the Commission has to send all legislative acts to MS parliaments simultaneously 
as sending them to other EU institutions.110 The MS are thus given the opportunity to 
send a reasoned opinion to the President of the European Commission, the European 
Parliament or the Council, if they consider that the proposed legislation does not 
comply with the principle of subsidiarity.111 Moreover, the EU institutions mentioned 
must take this reasoned opinion into consideration.112 Ultimately, if the European 
Parliament by a majority of votes or 55% of the members of the Council decides that 
the legislation is contrary to the principle of subsidiarity, the legislation will not be 
given further consideration.113 It is considered that the Commission takes seriously 
MS concerns of violations of the subsidiary principle, especially those of more 
powerful MS.114 
 Additionally, if a legislative act has been adopted, but a MS still considers it to 
be contrary to the subsidiary principle, according to Article 8 of Protocol No 2 of the 
TFEU, a MS has the possibility to bring an action to the CJEU. Nevertheless, it is 
considered that such actions are rarely successful due to “the low-intensity judicial 
review”115 of the CJEU.  
 Subsidiarity goes hand in hand with the principle of proportionality. Article 
5(4) of the TEU sets  
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Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action 
shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
Treaties.116  
Thus, actions taken by the EU must be in line with, and not overstepping, the aims 
which have to be achieved. This principle is established as a general principle of EU 
law by the CJEU. When elaborating on this principle, the Court has set that  
When there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse must 
be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be 
disproportionate to the aims pursued.117 
In order for the CJEU to evaluate whether the principle of proportionality is 
observed, the relevant interests must be identified and some value must be 
attributed to them. 118  Further, the Court would have to assess if the measures 
adopted were appropriate to achieve the aims and could the aim have been achieved 
by adopting less onerous measures.  
As mentioned above, the MS have the right to send a reasoned opinion to the 
President of the Commission, the Parliament or the Council if they consider that a 
legislative act is not in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. Nevertheless, the 
MS are not provided with the right to submit arguments on observance of the 
principle of proportionality. According to Craig, this is regrettable, as division of these 
principles is difficult and it is hard to see the reasoning why MS should be afforded 
the right to argue on subsidiarity but lack the right to submit their opinions on 
proportionality.119 Further the author will analyse the principle of sincere cooperation, 
which is crucial when exercising shared competences and also when cooperating 
between national and EU institutions. 
2.1.2. Principle of sincere cooperation 
One of the general principles of EU law is the principle or duty of sincere 
cooperation, which is established by Article 4(3) of the TEU  
Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member 
States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks, 
which flow from the Treaties. The Member States shall take any appropriate 
measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising 
out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. 
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and 
refrain from any measure, which could jeopardise the attainment of the 
Union's objectives.120  
Thus, MS are free to act in so far as the Treaties allow it, but in all circumstances MS 
must mutually assist each other, ensure the fulfilment of common EU goals and 
abstain from any actions which could hinder achievement of these goals. Even 
though this principle is very often associated with exercise of competences, for 
example, when concluding an international agreement, it has general application and 
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has to be observed by the EU and MS in all their actions. It has been said that, as 
such, “it operates as a constitutional safeguard for the protection of the EU’s 
interests”121. 
This principle prescribes that the national and EU institutions and bodies must 
work together when achieving EU aims and tasks. The CJEU has expressed that this 
is an expression of solidarity within the system of the EU. 122  This principle 
encompasses several duties of a MS. First, MS must implement EU legislation and 
secure its legal certainty in order for citizens to be able to identify their rights under 
EU law.123  Second, MS must ensure that EU law is being observed and have to 
ensure effective legal protection of EU legal norms. This obligation can only be set 
aside if such policing of EU law would create public disorder or it would be contrary 
to the fundamental rights or civil liberties of the MS.124 Third, the MS are obliged to 
penalise infringements of EU law, similarly as they would penalise any infringements 
of national laws. And finally, MS must take all necessary action to implement EU law 
and, if there are any obstacles in doing so, must notify the European Commission of 
such circumstances.  
Moreover, the CJEU has expressly set that national courts are under the 
obligation to interpret national law which gives effect to a EU directive in such a way 
as to ensure achievement of the aims of EU legislation.125 This is known as the 
Marleasing principle, stemming from a CJEU case, where the Court set:  
In applying national law, whether the provisions in question were adopted 
before or after the directive, the national court called upon to interpret it is 
required to do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the 
purpose of the directive in order to achieve the result pursued by the 
latter.126  
So in all circumstances, pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, MS are 
obliged to act and adopt decisions or other measures in a way which would be 
consistent with the aims of the EU and EU legislation. 
By virtue of Article 13(2) of the TEU, this principle is applicable not only to MS 
actions towards the EU, but also among EU institutions. The European Commission, 
the Parliament, the Council and other institutions must cooperate with each other in 
order to attain common EU goals and objectives. As the CJEU has set in European 
Parliament v Council of the European Union:  
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Inter-institutional dialogue, […], is subject to the same mutual duties of 
sincere cooperation as those which govern relations between Member States 
and the Community institutions.127  
The principle of sincere cooperation is also crucial in the activities of national DPAs. 
As will be illustrated in more detail below, national DPAs have the obligation to 
cooperate with each other, to communicate and resolve data protection issues or 
violations collectively, if needed. Article 28(6) of the Data Protection Directive has 
specified this, setting that the principle of sincere cooperation applies also to 
independent national DPAs. As reconfirmed by the CJEU in Weltimmo:  
Supervisory authorities are to cooperate with one another to the extent 
necessary for the performance of their duties, in particular by exchanging all 
useful information.128  
Thus, DPAs must cooperate with each other, for example, when investigating a 
breach of data protection rights. But further analysis in Chapter 3 will show this is 
sometimes not the case. 
It can be seen that the principle of sincere cooperation is a broad principle 
which is present in all relations between MS and EU institutions. It involves multiple 
obligations both for MS and the EU, which can also be seen in the field of data 
protection. The TEU sets the general obligation of sincere cooperation and, 
moreover, the Data Protection Directive specifically sets this obligation for national 
DPAs. The possible problems and particularities associated with this cooperation and 
competences will be discussed in more detail in the next Chapter. 
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3. COOPERATION AND OVERLAP OF COMPETENCES 
BETWEEN EU AND MS INSTITUTIONS AND BODIES IN 
DATA PROTECTION 
The aim of this article is to analyse whether there is any overlap, confusion or 
uncertainty in terms of competences between national and EU institutions and their 
obligation and effectiveness of cooperation. In order to fulfil this aim, this Chapter 
will discuss the existing relationship between data protection institutions in the EU, 
the recent case law of the CJEU and future developments that will follow after the 
General Data Protection Regulation comes into force. The level of cooperation and 
possible overlap of competences can be analysed on two levels. The competences 
and cooperation between EU and national institutions will be analysed on the vertical 
level. Competences and cooperation between different national DPAs will be 
discussed on the horizontal level.  
3.1. Vertical division of competences and cooperation 
3.1.1. Division of competences and cooperation between the European 
Commission and national DPAs 
As set in the previous Chapter, the competences of national DPAs are, firstly, 
established by Article 16 of the TFEU and, secondly, by Article 28 of the Data 
Protection Directive. In addition, this division is also governed by the general 
principles of shared competences in the EU. Thus, the issue of competences and 
cooperation on the vertical level must be analysed from this perspective as well as 
taking into account the special legal standing of national DPAs. As the analysis will 
show, some aspects are debatable, particularly the balance between the 
independence of national DPAs and the competences and influence of the 
Commission.  
 As indicated in Chapter 1.3.2, the independence of national DPAs is 
considered a crucial aspect when ensuring effective data protection in the EU. This 
has been expressly set in the primary law of the EU (Article 16(2) of the TFEU and 
Article 8(3) of the Charter), the Data Protection Directive as well as being 
continuously confirmed by the CJEU. When looking at the nature and legal setup of a 
national DPA it is evident that it stands between the EU and MS. Its mandate is set in 
both EU law and national law, so it balances between both of these governmental 
bodies, yet still retaining its independence. This hybrid nature and specific setup 
initially seems not to be in line with the general understanding of shared 
competences in EU law, which provides for a clear division as to when the EU or MS 
should act or abstain from action. 
This relationship and competences was one of the issues discussed in the 
CJEU judgment in Schrems. In this case the CJEU analysed if national authorities are 
competent to review individual claims regarding a Commission decision on data 
protection (in this particular case – the Commission decision on “safe harbour” 
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principles 129 ). The Court set that both the Commission and national DPAs are 
competent to find that a third country does or does not ensure an adequate level of 
protection for personal data. 130  But once the Commission has adopted such a 
decision, it becomes binding on the MS and their DPAs. So, as the general principles 
of exercise of shared competence sets, once the EU has acted in the particular area 
of law, the MS no longer have the right to act contrary to this action and must 
observe it. But in this particular case, the CJEU stated that  
a decision of that nature cannot eliminate or reduce the powers expressly 
accorded to the national supervisory authorities by Article 8(3) of the Charter 
and Article 28 of the directive.131 
The Court went on to affirm that neither Article 8(3) of the Charter nor Article 28 of 
the Data Protection Directive excludes from the competence of national DPA the 
oversight of personal data transfers to a third country which has been the subject of 
a Commission decision. 132  Moreover, the Court has set that national DPAs can 
examine “with complete independence”133 whether such Commission decisions are in 
line with the Data Protection Directive. So even if the Commission has the 
competence to adopt such decisions, MS do not lose their competence to review 
them and find them incompatible with the provisions of the Data Protection Directive. 
Indeed, if a Commission decision has been found invalid (only by the CJEU)134, the 
MS regain their full competence in regard to the particular subject area and can 
adopt decisions on the particular matter. With this decision, the Court firmly set that 
independent national DPAs are a crucial aspect in ensuring effective data protection 
in the EU and their competences in ensuring data protection in EU should not be 
compromised by Commission decisions. But it could create confusion for a DPA in 
terms of how far it can go when disputing such a decision. Indeed, soon after 
Schrems, there was wide confusion or uncertainty within national DPAs, which 
reacted differently to the judgment. A German DPA issued a statement that it would 
no longer permit data transfer to the United States of America on the basis of 
standard contractual clauses135, even though this ground for transfer was considered 
safe by the Commission136. This position was soon followed by other German DPAs. 
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They agreed on the position that other grounds for data transfer as set in the Data 
Protection Directive do not ensure protection of the rights of Europeans as required 
by the CJEU and thus should not be used by data controllers.137  There was no 
common ground or position in the EU, which can be burdensome and confusing, for 
example, for a data controller based in several MS and transferring data outside the 
EU.   
In other cases the CJEU has set that a national DPA is not free from any 
parliamentary influence because the national parliaments have to appoint the 
management of the authority and define its power, as well as grant financing.138 
Even if in other aspects such as taking decisions or investigating violations it must 
“remain free from any external influence”139, this freedom from influence is limited, 
as DPAs cannot be completely separated from both EU and MS oversight. The 
Commission has the competence to issue adequacy decisions and has to ensure 
consistent application and observance of EU law in MS. It is reasonable to assume 
that this can be done only if national DPAs communicate with the Commission and 
provide required information. Nevertheless, as the CJEU has set in Commission v 
Austria, the requirement to provide information is liable to subject a DPA to indirect 
influence from the executive body (i.e. the national government or the Commission), 
which is incompatible with the criterion of independence referred to in Article 28(1) 
of the Data Protection Directive.140 The executive body has the right to exercise 
scrutiny in order to secure compliance of the authority with the general legal order, 
but it must not go beyond this, in order to safeguard the authority’s independence.141 
So it can be argued that a fine line exists between the need for consistent application 
of EU data protection rules and possible indirect influence of national DPAs, which 
hinders their independence.142 
As the Data Protection Directive requires, the DPAs must in some way 
cooperate with the Commission in order effectively to ensure personal data 
protection. But during this cooperation, the Commission should refrain from undue 
influence on the DPAs so as to avoid hindering their independence. This sensitive 
cooperation mechanism can be observed in the operations of the Article 29 Working 
Party, which is the main cooperation mechanism between the EU and MS in data 
protection. Even though the Commission is a member of the Working Party, it does 
not have any voting rights and cannot participate in adopting decisions or 
opinions. 143  Thus, the Commission can express its opinion and participate in 
meetings of the Working Party, but it cannot influence decisions by casting its vote. 
This ensures that the opinions and recommendations are not “guided” or unduly 
influenced by the power of the Commission and its agenda. 
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As can be seen from the considerations above, the division of competences in 
data protection and the special nature of national DPAs is a complex issue. There is a 
fine balance between what the Commission is competent to do, to what extent it can 
influence the DPAs’ independence and when a DPA is competent to act or not. The 
legal norms in this respect are not very precise and detailed, so the competences 
and cooperation mechanisms have to be derived from the reasoning of the CJEU and 
assessed individually. As illustrated, this can cause uncertainties, confusion and 
formation of increasingly different approaches. This further confirms the need for a 
new regulatory framework, such as the General Data Protection Regulation, which 
would resolve these issues effectively. As Chapter 3.3 will illustrate, the new 
Regulation provides certain mechanisms in this regard. 
3.1.2. Division of competences and cooperation between other EU 
institutions and national DPAs 
As discussed previously, alongside the Commission there are several EU institutions 
and bodies which can facilitate cooperation between national and EU institutions. 
Such EU bodies as the Article 29 Working Party and the EDPS contribute to 
cooperation, as well as having certain competences in the area of data protection in 
the EU.  
The Article 29 Working Party is the main EU body which serves as the 
cooperation point between national DPAs. As it is composed of heads of national 
DPAs as well as the EDPS and a representative of the Commission, it is considered to 
form the common viewpoint on EU data protection rules. By cooperating in terms of 
issuing a common opinion or a recommendation, the members of the Working Party 
are said to contribute to the uniform application of national rules adopted pursuant 
to the Data Protection Directive.144 But some issues regarding the competences of 
the Working Party and its cooperation with national DPAs can create discrepancies.  
According to the Data Protection Directive, the MS have the obligation to 
designate a representative who will be a part of the Working Party. 145  The 
requirement to be a part of the Working Party is set in EU law and MS cannot deviate 
from it. If a representative is not able to participate in a meeting of the Working 
Party, the MS must communicate this to the Working Party and designate an 
alternative member who can participate in the meeting but who does not hold voting 
rights.146 So it has been established that during meetings, the viewpoint of all MS is 
expressed and heard. Such meetings create a forum for national DPAs, thus enabling 
them to exchange views, opinions, best practices and methods for ensuring uniform 
application of EU law. As each MS has only one vote, the opinions adopted equally 
reflect the view of all MS, not taking into account the economic status, population or 
other factors of the MS and putting all DPAs on the same level. 
But, even though this seems to create very effective cooperation between 
national DPAs, there are some deficiencies. Firstly, the legal formation of the Article 
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29 Working Party provides that it only has “advisory status”147. So, the Working Party 
has no competence to influence national DPAs or adopt a binding decision. The 
recommendations and opinions are non-binding; thus MS can choose not to follow 
them, in case they so wish. Existing EU legal norms do not provide for a requirement 
for MS to follow or in any way respect the recommendations or opinions of the 
Working Party. Indeed, it is possible that such requirement could compromise the 
essential condition for national DPAs to remain independent. This is also indicated as 
one of the problems in terms of DPA cooperation by the Working Party itself. It has 
set that  
the legal nature of the opinions and its influence on the national level should 
possibly by clarified and reinforced, while respecting the independence of 
DPAs.148 
Furthermore, representatives of DPAs can abstain from actively participating in 
adoption of opinions.  
In order to illustrate the negative effects of lack of clear cooperation 
mechanisms and binding nature of the recommendations, the case of the Google 
privacy issue investigation has to be mentioned. In 2012 Google announced a new 
privacy policy, which concerned national authorities. In order to examine the issue, 
the Working Party set up an ad hoc solution and asked the French DPA to take the 
lead role in investigating the matter.149 The investigation was informal and Google 
participated only on a goodwill basis. But once the initial investigation was complete, 
Google did not react to the initial findings and requests of the Working Party, as it 
did not have a binding nature.150 Thus, in order to persuade Google to change its 
privacy policy, the investigations were continued internally by the national DPAs of 
France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Spain and other MS. These DPAs were 
said to cooperate and share information and findings among each other,151 and the 
process resulted in several MS fining Google for breach of national data protection 
rules. Findings and fines differ among MS, as the investigations were conducted on 
the basis of respective national data protection rules. So even though some MS 
imposed a fine and requested compliance, this case illustrates the adverse effects of 
lack of a binding nature of opinions of the Working Party. Even though the Working 
Party was the initiator of the investigation and communicated the findings to Google, 
this was not taken into account, as there was no legal basis for requesting 
compliance. The Working Party can address an issue and bring it to the agenda of 
national DPAs but it does not have the competence and effective cooperation 
mechanisms which would ensure EU-wide compliance. Moreover, national DPAs are 
not required by any norms to react to issues raised by the Working Party. Indeed, 
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although Google’s privacy policy was applicable to all EU MS, nevertheless, only few 
authorities pursued an investigation and imposed fines.  
 Even though there is no strict requirement to follow decisions and participate 
actively in meetings, MS tend to follow the recommendations of the Working Party. It 
can be said that by cooperating with this EU body, the MS are fulfilling their duty of 
sincere cooperation as the Working Party strives to establish uniform application of 
EU law and EU interests. Recommendations usually contain very clear and descriptive 
mechanisms on how to solve certain issues (for example, following a new CJEU 
judgment, which establishes a new obligation or duty for DPAs) as well as detailed 
explanations of certain terms. So, national DPAs are given clear instructions and they 
do not have to invest their own resources in this aspect. Moreover, as these 
recommendations can be in line with EU objectives, the MS can apply them in order 
to ensure uniform application of EU law and avoid possible risks of failure to comply 
with EU law. Thus, the actions of the Working Party diminish the risk of failure to 
observe the principle of sincere cooperation.  
  As a member of the Article 29 Working Party and as a EU internal DPA, the 
EDPS also contributes to enhancing cooperation. This EU body is competent to 
address data protection issues and violations in EU institutions but does not have 
competence to adopt decisions or recommendations that would affect national DPAs. 
Indeed, it should be viewed similarly to any of the 28 independent national DPAs in 
terms of its competence to affect other national DPAs. Neither the procedure for 
appointing heads of the EDPS nor its management procedure is linked to national 
DPAs. 152  But, as with any other national DPA, it has the general obligation to 
cooperate with other national authorities. 153  This obligation is equal to that of 
national DPAs and the EDPS Rules of Procedure154 provide for specific action to be 
taken in this cooperation. Article 44(2) of the Rules of Procedure set that the EDPS 
shall exchange all relevant information, also information relating to best practices, as 
well as request national DPAs to exercise their powers and respond to such requests 
from DPAs, develop and maintain contacts with members of national authorities and 
cooperate with any other EU joint supervisory authorities (for example, the Schengen 
Information System).155 This requirement to cooperate is more elaborate than that of 
the Data Protection Directive. But, as the EDPS should be viewed as an independent 
DPA, it does not have a specific mandate to enhance cooperation between the EU 
and MS in terms of data protection. 
 As opposed to the legal requirement for national authorities, the EDPS has 
the obligation to participate in actions of the Article 29 Working Party.156 Contrary to 
the Commission, the EDPS has voting rights. As elaborated by the EDPS Rules of 
Procedure,  
[EDPS] shall contribute actively to the discussions and drafting of documents 
published by the Working Party which aim at providing a common 
interpretation of data protection legislation and giving expert advice to the 
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European Commission. In such cases, the EDPS shall put forward the Union 
perspective, where appropriate.157 
So although the EDPS does not have any discretion in choosing the level of activity in 
meetings of the Working Party, it has a general duty of cooperation.158 This sets the 
EDPS as an active promoter of the EU viewpoint on data protection and safeguards 
“legitimate and effective control of compliance with data protection rules”159.  
 It can be said that other EU institutions and bodies such as the Working Party 
and the EDPS contribute to advancing cooperation between the EU and national 
authorities. The Working Party, as a forum for national DPAs, has the power to 
enhance cooperation between national and EU authorities. Nevertheless, it lacks 
reinforcement power and has no competence to issue binding recommendations or 
opinions. The EDPS has the obligation to cooperate with national authorities, but it 
operates as an independent DPA, thus it has no specific mandate to enhance 
cooperation between national and EU institutions. Following adoption of the General 
Data Protection Regulation, the setup and competences of the Article 29 Working 
Party will be changed, as it will be reincarnated into the European Data Protection 
Board. This aspect will be further analysed in Chapter 3.3. 
3.2. Horizontal division of competences and cooperation 
3.2.1. Division of competences of national DPAs 
In order to analyse the level of horizontal cooperation and its particularities, it is first 
necessary to establish the division of competences between national DPAs. The 
theoretical background of MS competence in the area of data protection can be seen 
in Chapter 2, but for the purposes of this research it is important to assess in detail 
the horizontal division of competences among national DPAs.  
 The competences of national DPAs should be analysed from the perspective 
of cross-border issues. It is exactly cross-border situations or disputes where a clash 
or overlap of competences can arise and create problems in terms of effective 
protection of personal data. The clash of applicable law and competences of different 
national DPAs has been reviewed by the CJEU in Google Spain and Weltimmo. In 
both cases the CJEU was asked to evaluate if a national DPA is competent to review 
a certain issue and, if necessary, penalise the data controller for violation.  
 In Google Spain, the CJEU established that a data controller who is 
incorporated outside the EU but processed personal data in any of the MS through its 
establishment has to observe the data protection law of that MS. 160  Thus, the 
national DPA of that MS is competent to act in case such controller has possibly 
violated national data protection rules. A similar conclusion was derived in the later 
case of Weltimmo. In that case, among other questions, the CJEU was asked to 
establish whether a national DPA is competent to act even if, based on the criteria 
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laid down in Article 4(1)(a) of the Data Protection Directive, the law of another MS is 
applicable. 161  So, in general, could the DPA of one MS act if the national data 
protection law of another MS would apply to the situation at hand? The Advocate 
General and the CJEU both concluded that the national authority has the competence 
to investigate any complaint it receives, “irrespective of the applicable law”162. But, if 
that national authority would conclude that the law of another MS applies, it would 
not be competent to impose penalties and would have to refer the case to the 
national DPA of that MS.163 By doing so, the DPA would observe the obligation of 
sincere cooperation. This is an important conclusion for both national DPAs and data 
controllers. The DPAs are thus clearly given the possibility to investigate any possible 
data protection violations irrespective of the fact that the controller is registered in 
another MS. Data controllers have to take into consideration that their actions must 
comply with the data protection rules in each MS where they are “established”.164 
The Weltimmo ruling has set to emphasise the ruling in Google Spain in 
terms of national DPA competences. Previously, it was considered that a company 
can be established in one MS, operating in accordance with the data protection laws 
of that MS and other DPAs would not be competent to act. This setup was widely 
used by the big data controllers such as Facebook (located in Ireland and thus 
operating by the data protection rules of Ireland), Amazon (operating under the data 
protection rules of Liechtenstein) and others. Following Weltimmo, these companies, 
if they can be considered “established” in other EU MS, must also comply with 
national data protection laws of these MS. And, most importantly, any national DPA 
can examine and investigate their actions and find them in breach of their national 
data protection rules.  
This is exactly what the Belgian DPA did in November 2015, when it required 
Facebook (located in Ireland) to cease the use of a special cookie which allowed 
collecting personal data of persons who had not logged into Facebook. The Belgian 
court stated that such activities could be considered as collecting personal data, 
which is contrary to Belgian national data protection laws as data subjects have not 
given their consent.165 Moreover, the court set a fine of 250,000 euro per day if 
Facebook failed to cease processing such data. It is important to stress that these 
actions by Facebook had previously been investigated by the Irish DPA and found to 
be in compliance with local data protection law.166 Moreover, the Belgian DPA did not 
cooperate with the Irish DPA when concluding the investigation, possibly refraining 
from such actions as the viewpoint or national legislation differed in this aspect. 
Following the judgment, Facebook complied and started requiring users to log into 
Facebook to view certain content, which is what the court had required. 
                                           
161 Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón on CJEU case C-230/14, Weltimmo s. r. o. v 
Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság, EU:C:2015:639, para. 44. 
162 CJEU case C-230/14, Weltimmo s. r. o. v Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság 
Hatóság, para. 54. 
163 Ibid, para. 57. 
164 The CJEU has expressly defined what actions of the data controller could result in it being 
considered established in a MS in accordance with the Data Protection Directive. CJEU case 
C-230/14, Weltimmo s. r. o. v Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság, para. 
29.-31. 
165 Commission for the Protection of Privacy of Belgium. Judgment in the Facebook case. 
166 Hijmans, 2016, p. 355. 
 
 
37 
Nevertheless, the DPAs of the Netherlands, France, Spain, Hamburg and Belgium 
issued a common statement requiring Facebook to “comply with these orders in all 
territories of the EU as a means of contributing to ensure consistency with the 
requirement”167 of EU law. Thus, following the ruling in Weltimmo, DPAs are keen to 
ascertain their competences and act, even simultaneously.  
It is evident that such practice is not very effective, as it can create 
considerable confusion. DPAs can be confused in terms of who is competent to do 
what. Moreover, there can be unnecessary confusion for data controllers and data 
subjects as to what legal resources they can rely on, not to mention the elevated 
expenses, required resources and increased administrative burden for DPAs as well 
as possible conflict of competences. 168  If several DPAs investigated the same 
operations that a data controller carried out in their MS, it is probable that they 
would all reach different conclusions, apply their national law differently and fail to 
apply EU law uniformly. Or, in the alternative, act similarly as the Belgian and Irish 
DPAs have done, avoiding cooperation and issuing completely different decisions. So, 
even though Weltimmo has given more power and in some way clearer competences 
to national DPAs, it has created confusion and uncertainty for data controllers and 
data subjects. The presence of multiple competent DPAs can render each DPA less 
independent as it could be influenced by the decisions of other DPAs. It is argued 
that such a setup  
risks generating a situation of uncertainty that can undermine the effective 
protection of data subjects' rights, frustrate the legitimate expectations of 
data controllers and, eventually, decrease the authoritativeness of the DPAs 
called to oversee the process of personal data.169 
Additional risks from this arise in terms of cooperation between national DPAs. This 
aspect will be analysed in the next Chapter. 
The issue of competences could be resolved with adoption of the General 
Data Protection Regulation, which would, firstly, ensure that there is only one data 
protection regulation in EU and, secondly, specifically provide for such one-stop-shop 
mechanism by creating a lead supervisory authority, which would administer all 
issues in relation to the specific data controller which was established in the MS. This 
new development will be further analysed in Chapter 3.3.  
3.2.2. Cooperation between national DPAs 
As established in the previous Chapter, the national DPAs should cooperate with 
each other in order to ensure effective data protection in the EU. But as further 
analysis will illustrate, this is in many ways a hard aim to achieve due to lack of 
precise legal provisions and clear cooperation mechanisms. So, even though the 
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CJEU has set the obligation to the DPAs to cooperate, the current legal setup hinders 
it.   
The obligation of horizontal cooperation is set in Article 28(6) of the Data 
Protection Directive. This Article sets that a DPA is competent to exercise its powers 
within its MS, it can be asked to do so by a DPA of another MS and DPAs must 
cooperate with each other “to the extent necessary for the performance of their 
duties”170. Even though this Article puts forward the obligation to cooperate, it does 
not however set the exact procedure or specifics for such cooperation. Indeed, this is 
also not stipulated in any other provision of the Data Protection Directive or any 
other EU legal act. This lack of legal framework for cooperation creates several 
problems and uncertainties, which will be discussed in detail further. 
 Presumably, the issue of cooperation can arise in situations when a data 
controller is established in more than one MS and the possible data protection breach 
is of a cross-border nature. In such a situation, pursuant to Article 28(6) of the Data 
Protection Directive, the DPAs of the respective MS should cooperate in order to 
investigate the matter fully. But, as set out above, DPAs operate under the national 
law of their MS, so there would not be a single application of law. The actions of the 
data controller could be considered a violation of data protection laws in one MS, but 
not in another. Or in the alternative, one authority could consider the situation as not 
violating national data protection laws or find other violations in the same situation. 
The Article 29 Working Party has set that such different application of data 
protection laws across the EU “could have serious ramifications for the credibility of 
the EU data protection framework, both within the EU and at a global level”171. This 
can also be seen from previous cases of cooperation between national DPAs, such as 
the case of Google privacy policy investigations analysed in Chapter 3.1.2. This 
illustrates the main problems of the currently existing EU data protection legislation 
and disparities among MS. It can be argued that such problems should not exist as 
MS are obliged to observe the duty of sincere cooperation, which also envisages the 
obligation to interpret national law implementing EU law as close to the aim and 
purpose of respective EU legislation. But in reality this may not be the case.  
 When looking at this situation further, it is clear that many practical 
implications could arise in the process of cooperation. As currently there is no 
framework on the procedure of cooperation, DPAs are free to establish it themselves. 
For example, the form of communication is not specified, thus MS could face 
difficulties choosing a legitimate way of communicating. This problem could be more 
evident if the situation involved more DPAs – how would communication be 
organized and who would ensure that all DPAs involved have access to the same 
information? As current EU norms do not provide for a specific mechanism, the DPAs 
are free to disagree and fulfil their obligation to cooperate in a manner most suitable 
to them. It is possible that a DPA would follow the requirements of national 
administrative law, but again, the possible clash of national legal norms is an issue. 
Indeed, it is possible that national administrative law prescribes that the official 
language of communication should be the national language. So, for example, a 
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Latvian DPA would have to send a letter to a Danish DPA in Latvian. But this is 
clearly not effective and burdensome to the Danish DPA, who would then have to 
spend its resources on translation. And even if both DPAs would informally agree on 
communication in one language, the choice of language could be burdensome. Many 
similar practical issues remain unclear. For example, the time for providing 
information, the amount and format of information exchanged, methods of 
investigation, and so on. Respective national laws would regulate these issues, thus 
uniformity would be hard to obtain, if not impossible.  
 It should be considered that cooperation could also be hindered by national 
confidentiality obligations. Sharing information on investigation can include some 
personal data of the data subjects involved. Thus transferring this information to 
another authority should be done with due care, as the Data Protection Directive 
allows such actions, but does not regulate this aspect in detail.172 Moreover, as the 
current legal framework stands, national DPAs do not have any specific requirements 
as to which other public authorities may receive this data and how should it be 
treated if the matter proceeds to litigation.  
Further, the applicable legal norms do not provide for a specific obligation on 
DPAs to cooperate. The wording of Article 28(6) of the Data Protection Directive sets 
that “[e]ach authority may be required to exercise its powers by any authority of 
another Member State”173 (emphasis added). This does not give a clear duty to a 
DPA to commence any action at the request of another DPA and only refers to the 
possibility to do so. But this obligation should be fulfilled as a principle of EU law, i.e. 
cooperation between DPAs should be regarded as an extension of the principle of 
sincere cooperation pursuant to Article 4(3) of TEU. Moreover, national DPAs should 
respect this obligation of cooperation as a reflection of federal good faith.174 
In its advice paper, the Article 29 Working Party has also recognized the 
practical implementation of Article 28(6) of the Data Protection Directive as 
problematic and has proposed possible solutions for resolving problems. In this 
paper, the Working Party puts forward solutions as to how national DPAs should 
communicate and organise cooperation. Moreover, it suggests that the European 
Commission could consider developing rules or obliging a DPA to cooperate with 
other authorities and provide them with the necessary information, if the specific 
case could create significant repercussions at EU level and affect other authorities.175 
The problems illustrated above could lead to slow and burdensome cooperation and 
result in ineffective protection or further violation of a data subject’s rights. 
A study of effectiveness of cooperation between national DPAs and EU 
competition authorities has revealed that cooperation between DPAs could be more 
effective if, (a) there were a specific and binding legal basis with a structured and 
detailed set of rules for cooperation, (b) this legal basis would define forms of 
cooperation, its conditions and procedures and (c) it would include provisions on 
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exchange of confidential information. 176  As Chapter 3.3 will illustrate, the EU 
legislator has also arrived at similar conclusions and tried to implement these aspects 
in the General Data Protection Regulation. 
3.3. Future development of the General Data Protection 
Regulation 
Even though this article has been based on the EU data protection law as it stands at 
the time of concluding this research, following adoption of the General Data 
Protection Regulation in May 2016, it is crucial to analyse future changes. By the end 
of May 2018, the EU MS will be bound by the General Data Protection Regulation and 
thus there will be only one data protection regulation throughout the EU. Among 
other novelties introduced, the General Data Protection Regulation will change the 
competences of both national and EU institutions and, moreover, create new data 
protection bodies. The author will briefly illustrate the main changes which the new 
Regulation has introduced, in terms of the issues and topics discussed in this article.  
The new Regulation is the result of long and intensive deliberations between 
the EU and MS, in order to find the most suitable new legal mechanism for EU data 
protection. As the existing norms, especially the Data Protection Directive, did not 
successfully address the current issues and problems, a new uniform regulation was 
crucial.  The Commission has set that one of the objectives of the new Regulation is 
to  
establish a “one-stop-shop” for data controllers in the EU; to ensure stronger 
powers and adequate levels of resources (to DPAs) for enforcement and 
control; to develop binding cooperation procedures and effective mutual 
assistance between DPAs; to rationalise the current governance system to 
help ensuring a more consistent enforcement.177 
So, this Regulation addresses and tries to resolve these issues of DPA competence in 
cross-border issues as well as enhance cooperation by providing clearer and more 
precise mechanisms for it. 
In regard to competences of national DPAs, the new Regulation introduces a 
new concept of the lead supervisory authority. As Article 56 of the Regulation sets,  
[…] supervisory authority of the main establishment or of the single 
establishment of the controller or processor shall be competent to act as lead 
supervisory authority for the cross-border processing carried out by that 
controller or processor […].178 
This provision establishes the “one-stop-shop”, where one national DPA would be 
competent to act and issue decisions, even if the data controller were also 
established in other MS. This mechanism has been encouraged and supported also 
by the Council of the European Union, which has said that this mechanism is needed  
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in order to arrive at a single supervisory decision, which should be fast, 
ensure consistent application, provide legal certainty and reduce 
administrative burden.179 
This creates uniform application of data protection rules, legal certainty and clear 
expectations. It can be argued that this would create situations where a data 
controller would specifically choose to locate its main establishment in a more 
favourable MS; nevertheless, given that the data protection regulation will be mostly 
similar in all MS, it is not very relevant. It can be argued that the “one-stop-shop” 
mechanism gives DPAs the widest sense of independence; it puts all DPAs on the 
same level in terms of their skills, capacity and level of fairness.180 Together with the 
more elaborate rules on cooperation, this mechanism should ensure that the 
provisions of the Regulation and EU law are applied consistently and uniformly, thus 
also fostering legitimate expectations. Even though some authors have argued that 
the new Regulation includes some provisions which could hinder the effective use of 
the “one-stop-shop” mechanism,181 its real effectiveness will most likely show only 
with its implementation. 
 The new Regulation also includes specific provisions on cooperation between 
national DPAs and EU bodies. Detailed provisions of Chapter VII of the Regulation 
expressly deal with cooperation between national authorities, mutual assistance, 
joint operations and consistency mechanisms. For example, Articles 60 and 61 set 
specific obligations on supervisory authorities to cooperate effectively, free of charge, 
using standardized electronic forms, without delay and in a certain sequence of 
actions. So MS will be given clearer instructions on how to cooperate more 
effectively. The consistency mechanism is a new concept in data protection, which 
applies 
where a supervisory authority intends to adopt a measure intended to 
produce legal effects as regards processing operations which substantially 
affect a significant number of data subjects in several Member States.182  
This concept is introduced in order to ensure uniform application of the General Data 
Protection Regulation by cooperation between national authorities and the 
Commission, when necessary.183 In addition, the Commission is given the possibility 
to implement acts specifying the format and procedures for mutual assistance and 
arrangements for exchange of information between national and EU data protection 
institutions.184 With these detailed provisions and mechanisms, the EU legislator has 
tried to address the existing problematic issues of cooperation and has taken into 
account the previous opinion of the Working Party on how to improve cooperation. 
 One of the biggest novelties of the new Regulation is establishment of a 
European Data Protection Board (hereinafter – EDPB). The EDPB will replace the 
Article 29 Working Party and be composed of representatives of the national 
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authorities and the EDPS.185 The Commission will be able to participate in meetings, 
but will not have a voting right.186 Similarly to national DPAs and the Working Party, 
the EDPB will be completely independent and will not be authorised by any other 
institution. The EDPB is established as a guardian of application of the new 
Regulation and will have the power to request the Commission to perform a 
multitude of activities in order to ensure effective and consistent application of the 
Regulation. The EDPB will also have competence to resolve disputes between 
national DPAs in order to foster the consistency mechanism. In such cases, decisions 
of the EDPB will be binding.187 It is presumed that this setup should resolve the 
efficiency problems of the Working Party. 
It is argued that, notwithstanding the elaborate provisions on cooperation 
and division of competences, the new Regulation may fail to achieve its aims of 
harmonization of EU data protection laws. This could happen due to the fact that the 
Regulation still leaves a lot of room for it to coexist with national norms, thus 
hindering the goal of harmonization. 188  Other authors indicate that the issue of 
exchange of confidential information is not specifically addressed.189 Moreover, the 
historical perspective of personal data protection norms could also disrupt 
harmonization as, despite two decades of data protection in the EU, MS still hold 
differing opinions as to the objectives of the regime and the best means of achieving 
those objectives.190 
 By setting that the new legal instrument is a regulation rather than a 
directive, the EU legislator “significantly limits the margin of discretion of the Member 
States”191. Taking into consideration existing problems in terms of different legal 
norms in each MS and lack of clear legal mechanisms to ensure effective 
cooperation, the EU legislator has acted in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. The view that many cooperation and competence 
issues may be resolved more successfully on a EU level has been present for a long 
time and further encouraged also by the Working Party. 192  Furthermore, data 
protection as such  
can be better regulated at Union level, if only because of the inherent cross-
border effects of the action, both within and outside the EU territory, in 
compliance with the second element of the principle of subsidiarity.193 
The new Regulation can help achieve EU aims more effectively than MS could on a 
national level and increase trust in the EU as the guarantor of personal data 
protection in the EU.194  
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CONCLUSION 
When looking at the general concepts of personal data, the applicable legal norms as 
well as competent institutions, it is evident that the discrepancies in data protection 
regulations in MS are noteworthy. As data protection is a shared competence, the MS 
can adopt national data protection measures slightly differently, taking into 
consideration the overall aims and objectives of EU law and the particularities of both 
the Data Protection Directive and rulings of the CJEU. But the current EU legal 
framework lacks clear and precise norms on division of competences in particular 
cross-border situations and, moreover, does not provide guidance on cooperation 
mechanisms. Thus, both horizontal and vertical cooperation and division of 
competences can be hindered and rendered ineffective and burdensome.  
When analysing cooperation on the horizontal level, it can be seen that there 
is a very thin balance between the Commission’s competence to adopt decisions and 
overlook the application of EU law and the requirement for national DPAs’ 
independence. It is not possible to determine which right stands above the other; 
thus that conclusion can only be reached by the CJEU when analysing a particular 
case. But such a lack of clear division and limits to the exercise of the competences 
of EU and national institutions can cause disputes and ineffective addressing of 
personal data violations. If a national DPA is not sure if it is competent to act or 
competent to review a data subject’s claim, the rights of that data subject can be 
hindered. Moreover, if the Commission oversteps its competence when issuing a 
decision (as it had done with the “safe harbour” principles), the independence and 
competences of the national DPA are threatened. So, it is difficult to determine the 
level of cooperation between the Commission and national DPAs that would be in 
line with (a) the complete independence of national DPAs, (b) the competences of 
the Commission and DPAs as set in EU law and (c) the general EU legal system in 
terms of shared competences.  
The situation is similar in relationship between the Article 29 Working Party 
and the EDPS. The Working Party creates a forum for MS to cooperate and exchange 
views on specific issues, deliberate and arrive at a common conclusion. But it does 
not have competence to bind MS or data controllers, so there is no obligation on MS 
to actively participate in its meetings and issuing of recommendations or opinions. 
Consequently, the recommendations and opinions do not have binding force and 
following them is a matter for the discretion of national DPAs. This aspect can hinder 
cooperation and uniform application of EU data protection norms. MS should 
nonetheless cooperate with the Working Party and follow its guidance in order to 
fulfil their duty of sincere cooperation. In addition, even though the Working Party 
(as a collective of several national DPAs) can investigate a possible breach, it has no 
competence to request compliance. With the current legal setup, this can be done 
only on a national level, when a national DPA concludes its own investigation and 
issues a decision. Furthermore, the EDPS has the obligation to cooperate with 
national authorities, but it operates as an independent DPA; thus it has no specific 
mandate to enhance overall cooperation between national and EU institutions.  
The research shows that the division of competences and cooperation 
between national DPAs currently holds the most issues and possible causes for 
ineffective protection of personal data. Firstly, following recent judgments of the 
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CJEU, the competences of DPAs to act in certain matters are not expressly clear. It 
has been established that any DPA can investigate a claim raised by a data subject, 
irrespective of the location of the data controller. So, if a controller processes 
personal data in multiple MS, the DPAs of all of these MS are competent to review 
the controller’s actions. Even though this seems to ensure greater observation of 
compliance with data protection norms, it can be confusing to the data subject and 
controller, it can elevate expenses and required resources for investigation, and 
result in different conclusions as well as conflicts of competences. Even though, 
theoretically, this should be resolved by mutual cooperation between national DPAs, 
the analysis shows that cooperation is far from effective.  
EU data protection norms lack clear legal mechanisms to ensure effective 
cooperation between national DPAs. The law only stipulates the obligation to 
cooperate. Nevertheless, it does not give any tools to do it. Problems can arise on 
many levels, for example, in terms of highly practical issues such as time, language, 
form of communication, materials to be provided, and division of resources. 
Furthermore, even though DPAs can share their findings in investigations, these are 
based on national data protection rules and cannot be endorsed by other DPAs. So in 
a cross-border case, every DPA has to start its own investigation in accordance with 
national legal norms (both in terms of data protection and administrative or criminal 
procedure). The same problem could be addressed completely differently in each 
MS, depending on the particularities of national data protection laws and the 
competences of national authorities. This is clearly ineffective and does not provide 
for fast and efficient resolution of a problem and compromises legal certainty, 
uniform application of EU law and legitimate expectations. These issues clearly 
illustrate that the current legal framework for cooperation and division of 
competences in data protection is not effective and can create many obstacles for 
ensuring data protection in the EU.  
With adoption of the General Data Protection Regulation, the legislator has 
confirmed that there is a pressing need for a new legal setup in EU data protection. 
Even though it will only come into force in 2018, the future prospects seem hopeful. 
The new Regulation strives to correct and address, among other issues, the main 
problems in regards to cooperation and competences of EU and national institutions. 
As the changes are significant, it is safe to say that the EU data protection world will 
be put on a new level of advancement. 
